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RECENT DECISIONS
DOMESTIC RELATIONS-DISCRETION OF THE CHILDREN'S COURT
IN ORDERING MEDICAL CARE OVER PARENTAL OBJECTION.-A county
health officer I sought an order of the Children's Court for therapy
to rectify the harelip and split palate of a boy aged fourteen. The
child and his father objected to surgery, expecting a cure through
"forces of the universe." Under an interim order, experts attempted
unsuccessfully to persuade the boy to accept treatment. A denial of
the petition by the Children's Court was reversed by the Appellate
Division. The Court of Appeals sustained the Children's Court,
holding that the trial judge properly exercised discretion in refusing
to order treatment where he expected an adverse psychological re-
action would frustrate its benefits, and where there was no present
emergency. Matter of Seiferth, 309 N.Y. 80, 127 N.E.2d 820 (1955).
The power of the state to protect infants is derived from its role
as parens patriae.2 As one of the sovereign's prerogative powers, it
was exercised by courts of equity antecedently to any statutory au-
thorization.3 A parent's primal right of custody was subject to in-
tervention by the courts on behalf of the child's "real and permanent
interests." 4 He could not resist transfer of custody where he was
unable or unwilling to execute his legal duty in the child's regard.5
This duty was deemed breached by neglect to provide medical care.6
Legislation safeguarding children against neglect first took the form
of criminal statutes.7 A delinquent parent was made criminally liable
' Proceedings in Children's Court may be instituted on petition of any
interested person who knows the child to be neglected or delinquent, or other-
wise within the jurisdiction of the court. N.Y. CHILD. CT. AcT § 10. The
Court has jurisdiction of physically handicapped children [id. § 6(1) (e) ] whose
defect incapacitates them, totally or partially, for education or gainful employ-
ment. Id. § 2(7). Local health officers have the duty of enforcing the Public
Health Law [N.Y. PuB. HEAITH LAW § 324(1) (e)] and that law declares
it state policy to provide services for the rehabilitation of handicapped children.
Id. § 2580.2 See Butler v. Freeman, Amb. 301, 27 Eng. Rep. 204 (Ch. 1756).
3 The King v. De Manneville, 5 East. 221, 223, 102 Eng. Rep. 1054, 1055
(K.B. 1804) (dictum) ; see, e.g., United States v. Green, 26 Fed. Cas. 30, No.
15256 (C.C.D. R.I. 1824); De Manneville v. De Manneville, 10 Ves. Jun. 52,
32 Eng. Rep. 762 (Ch. 1804).
4 Wilcox v. Wilcox, 14 N.Y. 576, 578 (1856) (dictum) ; Matter of Waldron,
13 Johns. R. 418, 421 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1816) (dictum); see United States v.
Green, supra note 3 at 31.
5 See The King v. De Manneville, supra note 3; De Manneville v.
De Manneville, supra note 3.
6 Heinemann's Appeal, 96 Pa. 112 (1880).
7 Criminal liability for neglect of children was first proposed in New York
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for failing to provide medical care whether the statute specifically
prohibited such conduct s or condemned neglect in general terms only.9
Although criminal statutes still exist,10 the turn of the century
witnessed the introduction of a more affirmative statutory protection
of children's life and health in the form of the children's court acts."
The courts created by these statutes are vested with jurisdiction over
neglected children to protect them through the exercise of the custody
power.12 Where the parent refuses necessary medical attention, the
court will take jurisdiction of the child and order the care it deems
necessary.' 8 The court will override parental objections to necessary
therapy whenever the child's life is at stake.14 Where the child is in
some lesser peril, the courts sometimes refuse to intervene because
the prognosis of successful treatment is uncertain.' 5 More often,
however, they order treatment. 16
Under the New York Children's Court Act, a child is "neglected"
where his parent neglects or refuses necessary medical care,17 or
where, because of want, suffering, or improper guardianship, his health
is injured or endangered.' 8  The act affords no standard for deter-
in Section 333 of the Draft of the Penal Code (1864). Such neglect was
made a misdemeanor by the enactment of Section 288 of Chapter 676 of the
Laws of New York 1881.
8 E.g., N.Y. PENAL LAw §482(1) ; IDAHO CODE § 18-1501 (1947) ; MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 617.56 (1945); MONT. Rav. CODE tit. 94, §301 (1947).
1) E.g., CONN. GEN. STAY. § 6416 (1918) [currently § 8586 (Revision of
1949)], State v. Moran, 99 Conn. 115, 121 Ati. 277 (1923); ILT REv. STAT.
c. 68, § 4 (1943) [currently c. 68, § 24 (1951)], People v. Booth, 390 Ill. 330,
61 N.E.2d 370 (1945).
10 See current statutes cited notes 8 and 9 supra.
".The first juvenile court was established in Cook County (Chicago),
Illinois, in 1899. The first state-wide system of such courts was established
in Utah in 1908. See NEumEYER, JuvE NLE DELINQUENCy IN MODERN SoCIr=
340-42 (1950). "Prior to the adoption of the Children's Court Act of the
State of New York in 1922 [Laws of N.Y. 1922, c. 547], resting upon con-
stitutional edict, there existed no affirmative statutory power to exercise direct
control over the physical welfare of a child." Matter of Vasko, 238 App. Div.
128, 129, 263 N.Y. Supp. 552, 554 (2d Dep't 1933).
2 See NEumEYr, op. cit. supra note 11, at 343; Matter of Hudson, 13
Wash.2d 673, 126 P.2d 765 (1942). In the Hudson case, an order of the chil-
dren's court for an operation to save a child's life was vacated. This deter-
mination resulted from the fact that, while the trial court could have found
the parents unfit because they had refused medical aid needed by the child, it
had not so found, and had not deprived them of custody.
13 N.Y. CHILD. CT. ACT § 24.
14 Matter of Vasko, supra note 11; People v. Labrenz, 411 11. 618, 104
N.E.2d 769, cert. denied, 344 U.S. 824 (1952) ; Morrison v. State, 252 S.W.2d
97 (Mo. App. 1952).
Is See Note, 41 GEO. L.J. 226, 235 (1953) [quoting Matter of Tuttendario,
21 Pa. Dist. Rep. 561 (1911)]; 39 MINN. L. Ray. 118 (1954).16 See, e.g., Matter of Carstairs, 115 N.Y.S.2d 314 (Child. Ct. 1952) ; Matter
of Rotkowitz, 175 Misc. 948, 25 N.Y.S.2d 624 (Child. Ct. 1941); Mitchell v.
Davis, 205 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
17N.Y. CHILD. CT. AcT § 2(4) (e).
"S Id. § 2(4) (g).
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mining when medical care is necessary and, prior to the instant case,
the courts had evolved no rule of universal application. In the Vasko
case,x9 the Appellate Division upheld an order for removal of a child's
eye affected with a tumor which threatened her life, although the
surgery involved a fifty per cent risk of life. In the Rotkowitz case
the court stated that it had power under the Children's Court Act to
order an operation ". . . in instances where ... the future of a child
is at stake." 20 In that case surgery was ordered to arrest progress
of a foot deformity resulting from polio. The court found that the
order was warranted because the deformity ". . . will become worse
as time goes by unless operative correction is had now.'" 21 More
recently, the Children's Court, in ordering psychiatric examination,22
held a child neglected because his parent failed to obtain psychiatric
guidance for him.23 The child was not physically ill, but his conduct
suggested a need for such treatment.
In addition to the difficult task of evaluating physical and psycho-
logical factors in the child's condition, the court may have the further
responsibility of passing upon objections which invoke the constitu-
tional guarantee of religious liberty. 24  Parents often assert that by
consenting to the medical intervention proposed they would violate
their religious duty.2 5  While the Supreme Court has never deter-
mined the status of religious objections where the health of an indi-
vidual child was the sole issue,2 6 state appellate courts have regularly
overruled such contentions.2 7  In New York, the merit of religious
objections has never been passed upon in proceedings for neglect
under the Children's Court Act. In one case, the Appellate Division
dismissed as whimsical and arbitrary a mother's objection expressed
in terms of religious obligation.28 In the instant case, the Court of
19 Matter of Vasko, 238 App. Div. 128, 263 N.Y. Supp. 552 (2d Dep't 1933).
20 Matter of Rotkowitz, supra note 16 at 950, 25 N.Y.S.2d at 627 (emphasis
added).
21 Id. at 951, 25 N.Y.S.2d at 627 (emphasis added).
22 "The court in its discretion, either before or after a hearing, may cause
any person within its jurisdiction to be examined by a physician, psychiatrist
or psychologist appointed or designated for the purpose by the court." N.Y.
CHILD. CT. AcT § 24.
23 Matter of Carstairs, 115 N.Y.S.2d 314 (Child. Ct. 1952).
24 See People v. Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769, cert. denied, 344 U.S.
824 (1952) ; Morrison v. State, 252 S.W.2d 97 (Mo. App. 1952).
25 See, e.g., People v. Labrenz, supra note 24. The father of the Labrenz
child stated, ". . . it is my belief that the commandment given us in Genesis,
Chapter 9, Verse 4 ... [signifies] that any use of the blood is prohibited. .. ."
104 N.E.2d at 771. The mother testified that if the baby died after the pro-
posed blood transfusion, that treatment ". . . not only destroys our chances
but also the baby's chances for future life. We feel it is more important
than this life." 104 N.E.2d at 772.
26 Certiorari was denied in the Labrens case, supra note 24.
27 See, e.g., People v. Labrenz, supra note 24; Morrison v. State, supra note
24; Mitchell v. Davis, 205 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).




Appeals adopted the distinction between philosophy and religion
which had been made in the courts below.29 The father's objection
that a cure should be effected only through the "forces of the universe"
was dismissed as merely philosophical. However, in a criminal prose-
cution for parental neglect, a defense predicated upon religious
grounds was directly overruled.30 Unlike many other jurisdictions,
New York gives explicit legislative recognition to a parent's right to
reject, on religious grounds, certain health services prescribed by law
for children.31  Yet, in the provisions of the Children's Court Act
for the protection of neglected children, there is no such statutory
safeguard of parental religious belief.
The instant decision seems to establish a criterion for determin-
ing when medical treatment will be ordered. The Court recognized
that the boy's condition created a drastic situation. However, it found
that no present emergency existed, since an operation performed in
future years would be substantially as effective as one performed at
the present time. The Court further decided that where the post-
surgical phase of treatment 3 2 required the child's cooperation, his
expected adverse psychological reaction to the operation justified the
trial judge, in exercising his discretion, to refuse the order. Though
the Court denied the order, it adopted the view expressed by the
lower courts in the instant case, and in earlier cases, 33 that psycho-
logical factors may be considered in determining whether or not a
drastic situation exists. It was further recognized that a physical
defect will warrant remedial intervention when it appreciably impairs
a function notably significant in social and economic life.
The Court interpreted necessity of medical care for children as
including not mere survival, but the physical and psychological capac-
ity to meet the exigencies of daily living. This view notably fulfills
equity's traditional concern for the welfare of children. However,
where psychological assistance is deemed necessary to correct a child's
conduct pattern, the area of possible conflict between therapy and
29See Matter of Seiferth, 127 N.Y.S.2d 63 (Child. Ct. 1954), reV'd on
other grounds, 285 App. Div. 221, 137 N.Y.S.2d 35 (4th Dep't 1955).30 See People v. Pierson, 176 N.Y. 201, 68 N.E. 243 (1903).
31 N.Y. PUB. H ALTH LAW § 2583 (exempts from the mandates of Sections
2580-2583 [medical care of the handicapped] a child whose parents object be-
cause they rely exclusively for healing on the practice of the religious tenets
of a church); N.Y. EDuc. LAW § 3204(5) (permits a child to be excused from
health classes in the schools if the instruction conflicts with the religion of the
child or his parent). In New Jersey, the exemption of religious healing ex-
tends not only to the enactments on handicapped children, but to all provisions
respecting neglected children. N.J. STAT. ANNi. tit. 9, § 9:6-1.1 (Supp. 1954).
32 After the surgery, repair of the split palate would be completed through
use of dental appliances. The boy would then have to be trained in the proper
use of his palate and mouth, in order that he could speak clearly.
33 See Matter of Carstairs, 115 N.Y.S.2d 314 (Child. Ct. 1952) ; Matter of
Rotkowitz, 175 Misc. 948, 25 N.Y.S.2d 624 (Child. Ct. 1941).
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religion is enlarged.34  It is submitted that a definitive determination
of the status of parental religious objections should be written into
the Children's Court Act.35 It may be noted finally that the indoc-
trination of a child for the purpose of securing his consent to surgery,
here ordered to forestall adverse psychological consequences, 36 is a
novelty in the reported cases.
DOMESTIC RELATIONS- PARENT HAVING CUSTODY PERMITTED
TO REMOVE CHILDREN FROM STATE.-Respondent-mother, who had
obtained custody of her two infant children in a habeas corpus pro-
ceeding, intended to remarry and remove with them to another state.
She petitioned the Court to modify the custody order so as to permit
such removal. Appellant-father cross-motioned for the children's
custody and to restrain the mother from removing them. The Court
of Appeals, without opinion, affirmed a determination of the Supreme
Court 1 which held that, under the circumstances presented, the
mother's petition should be granted, with provisos.2 Freed v. Freed,
309 N.Y. 668, 128 N.E.2d 319 (1955).
The jurisdiction of a state to determine the custody of infants
within its territory has its origin in the protection that is due the in-
competent or helpless.3 In England, it was first absorbed by chancery
through the delegation by the crown of its prerogative, as parens
patrie, to care for infants.4  In the United States, though an original
bill in equity may still be brought,5 statutes have been enacted which
34 Religious considerations are more likely to arise in regulating children's
conduct than in making a choice of remedy for their physical ills. The methods
and recommendations of an individual psychiatrist diagnosing or treating a con-
duct problem might very well conflict with religious precepts or prohibitions.
35A provision based upon conflict with religion (cf. N.Y. EDuc. LAW§ 3204), and saving the requirements of law as to the control of communicable
disease, would seem preferable to a narrower exemption predicated upon pref-
erence for religious healing (cf. N.Y. PUB. HEA.TH LAW § 2583).
36 Under the interim order, the boy and his father were shown the results
obtained in various cases through the treatment proposed and the method of
treatment was explained in detail. While they professed themselves impressed,
their opposition was not diminished.
I Matter of Freed, 133 N.Y.S.2d 849 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd iner., 284 App. Div.
892, 134 N.Y.S.2d 595 (2d Dep't 1954).
2 The Court provided for a substantial enlargement of the father's custody
and visitation rights.
3 Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y. 429, 431, 148 N.E. 624, 626 (1925) (dictum);
See JACOBS AND GOEBEL, DOMESTIC RELATIONS 943 (3d ed. 1952).
4 See JACOBS AND GOEBEL, op. cit. supra note 3, at 943.
5 Finlay v. Finlay, supra note 3 at 433, 148 N.E. at 626 (dictum).
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